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Most activation policies are based on a simplistic conception of responsibility: behaving
responsibly coincides with quickly reintegrating the labour market. Local welfare agents
are called to push beneﬁciaries to actively endorse this goal. But the issue of responsibility
is much more complex. Drawing on Sen’s capability approach, this article suggests that
responsibilisation of recipients requires both empowerment and granting them more real
freedom of choice on the labour market. Against the present trend toward hypertrophying
individual responsibility, it calls for a more equilibrated balance between individual and
social responsibility. The objective is not to deﬁne an impracticable ideal of responsibility,
but to provide a yardstick for assessing activation programmes.
The trend towards activation in contemporary social policies, what Bob Jessop called,
in a somewhat provocative way, the Schumpeterian workfare state (Jessop, 1994), is by
now well documented. In the last decades, a great variety of reforms were passed in most
OECD countries with a view to transforming welfare into an instrument of activation (e.g.
RMI in France, TANF in the United States, the NewDeal programmes in the UK, etc.). This
evolution entails a threefold transformation: (a) social expenses are to be activated and
become productive in line with the social investment state; (b) benefit recipients should
be induced (via ‘making work pay’ programmes) or constrained (via workfare schemes)
to quickly reintegrate the labour market; (c) local agents of the welfare state as well
as private contracted-out providers are to act as intermediaries towards such quick and
possibly long-lasting professional reinsertion. At the core of all these changes, there is an
implicit and undisputed view of what objectives responsible individuals should pursue
within the field of social policies. In a nutshell, these targets are strongly connected
with increasing the employment rates at a macro level, and accelerating reintegration
into the labour market at a micro level. As a result, acting responsibly coincides with
getting people back to work as quickly as possible. This issue being settled, the challenge
faced in social policies boils down to finding the most efficient modes of governance in
order to promote such responsible behaviour among the local agents of the welfare state
and the beneficiaries. In other terms, how can these actors be induced or constrained
(via sticks and/or carrots) to endorse such a view of responsibility? In this way, the issue
of governance is reduced to a mere technical question of efficiency, and all political
and normative issues dealing with equity, social justice or the adequate combination
of individual and collective responsibility are left aside. This article contends that the
issue of responsibility is much more complex and needs to be carefully re-examined.
Drawing on Sen’s capability approach (Sen, 1999), the first section roughly identifies
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the main prerequisites of genuinely responsible behaviour, i.e. adequate resources and
opportunities on the one side, freedom of choice on the other one. The following two
sections apply this analytical and normative framework to the case of local agents and
beneficiaries in activation policies such as workfare programmes, training measures,
subsidised jobs or any other form of professional guidance. This provides an assessment
of specific activation programmes (i.e. what is the meaning and content of responsible
behaviour purported in them?) and modes of governance (i.e. how is responsibility
distributed between the central administration, the local agents and the beneficiaries?)
against the capability framework of responsibility. The final section synthesises the main
findings of the article and concludes.
The pre requ is i tes o f respons ib i l i t y in the capab i l i t y approach
The capability approach insists on two necessary preconditions of responsible behaviour:
adequatemeans and power to act and real freedom to choose one’s way of living. Hence, if
someone is not adequately equipped in terms of capacity to act, s/he cannot be considered
as truly responsible. In Sen’s words, the responsible person should then be provided with
sufficient resources or commodities (e.g. goods, services, incomes, social transfers, etc.)
and with appropriate factors of conversion (i.e. competencies, available opportunities,
etc.) allowing her or him to convert these resources into real capacity to act. However,
such empowerment is not sufficient to foster responsibility. Indeed, if a person adequately
empowered is not free to use his or her capacity in the way s/he chooses to (or to use
Sen’s recurrent formula, ‘in the way s/he has reason to value’), it still does not make sense
to speak of responsible or irresponsible behaviour. In Sen’s language:
Without the substantive freedom and capability to do something, a person cannot be
responsible for doing it. But actually having the freedom and capability to do something
does impose on the person the duty to consider whether to do it or not, and this does involve
individual responsibility. In this sense, freedom is both necessary and sufficient for responsibility.
(Sen, 1999: 284, emphasis added)
In the field of social policy, the enhancement of the capacity to act, or empowerment,
entails taking into account at least two dimensions: the resources made available (i.e. are
they sufficient in amount and duration? What conditions are recipients subject to?); and
the opportunities, e.g. jobs or training, open to the recipients (i.e. what is the quantity and
quality of opportunities available?). In actual active labour market programmes (ALMPs)
in different countries, these two issues of resources and opportunities are tackled in a
great variety of ways. Indeed, if activation always implies a higher focus on individual
responsibility, this may coincide either with more extended collective interventions or
with the retreat of the state. And this variety within the field of ALMPs indicates a
significant diversity in the ways to conceive the balance between individual and collective
responsibility, which heavily impacts on local agents’ practices and on their expectations
towards beneficiaries. With regard to these local actors, Sen’s capability approach sets
a very high standard of responsibility. Indeed, genuine freedom of choice, which is
a prerequisite for responsible behaviour in the capability approach, depends on the
availability of the three options identified by Hirschman (1970) – loyalty, exit and voice.
Local actors, i.e. welfare agents and beneficiaries, should not be constrained to loyalty,
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but should be allowed not to comply with the administrative view of activation without
incurring unbearable penalties as a consequence (i.e. exit), and they should also be able
to negotiate and somewhat influence the content of ALMPs (i.e. voice). Hence, the extent
to which local actors are allowed to reinterpret the centrally designed conception of
activation and adjust it to local circumstances is a necessary condition of their behaving
responsibly.
To sum up, for Sen (1999), responsibility necessitates a combination of capacity to act
(opportunity freedom) and freedom to choose (process freedom). The next two sections
examine these two dimensions of responsibility in the case of activation policies.
Respons ib i l i t y and capac i t y to ac t in ac t i va t ion po l i c ies
The local actors’ capacity to act depends on at least three complementary dimensions.
First, the way to organise financial redistribution within the welfare state clearly impacts
on the conception of responsibility in social integration policies. Indeed, according to the
amount and duration of social security benefits, as well as to the eligibility conditions and
other requirements imposed on recipients, the expectations in terms of responsibility will
vary significantly. In countries such as the US or the UK, where benefits are envisaged
as potential sources of poverty traps, redistribution of cash resources is limited both
in amount and duration, and strict conditionalities are imposed (Handler, 2004; King,
1999). This implies that benefit systems are carefully reviewed in order to eliminate
such traps and set up appropriate financial incentives. In these countries, a specific
normative reference is imposed with regard to the link between cash redistribution and
activation (i.e. too many redistributed resources equals less capacity or willingness to act
on behalf of the recipients), and competing views of the ‘welfare-activation’ nexus are
discarded by decision-makers (Bonvin, 2006). Such ambition to make welfare policies
more dissuasive has a strong influence on local welfare agents who have to work in
shorter time spans and are pushed to privilege quick-fix remedies and avoid long-term
schemes aiming at long-lasting professional reintegration (Peck and Theodore, 2000).
This especially holds for the most disadvantaged groups. Indeed, retrenchment measures
inducing benefit reductions often coincide with a corresponding reduction of the time
available for activating recipients, and a consequent risk of creaming and selective
practices at local level (Benarrosh, 2006). By contrast, programmes providing generous
and long-lasting benefits, e.g. in Scandinavian countries or in Switzerland, endorse the
opposite view (i.e. more redistributed resources equals more capacity to act), which allows
for more ambitious and longer-term interventions at local level. This opposite conception
of cash redistribution also entails another division of responsibilities between individual
and collective actors: whereas, in the former instance, responsibility is first and foremost
a matter of individual will, with the state mostly playing a moralising part in this direction,
it is here envisaged as a joint task of the individual and the state. In much the same spirit,
Gazier (1999) envisages the enhancement of employability as the common duty of the
individual job-seekers and the public bodies, what he called ‘interactive employability’.
Second, the design and content of activation measures is also far from uniform.
In strictly quantitative terms, the amount of resources devoted to ALMPs greatly differs
among countries (EC, 2006). And the objectives pursued in such programmes range from
pushing people back to work or enhancing their human capital and qualifications to
the creation of temporary jobs in public administration, the payment of job subsidies
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to employers on the private labour market or measures designed to help create self-
employment. As a result, there is a great variety of services provided within public
employment services (as evidenced for instance by Personnaz et al., 2007). Thus,
ALMPs may endorse very different views of activation promoting respectively work,
employability, occupation, or looser objectives such as autonomy or social integration
(for an illustration of such diversity in OECD countries, see Tergeist and Grubb, 2006).
And this diversity in turn plays a key role in shaping local agents’ practices. Indeed, if
the normative reference underlying ALMPs focuses on the development of qualifications,
and considerable financial resources aremobilised to this purpose, long-term programmes
may be designed to foster durable professional integration in a qualified job. By contrast,
if work is considered to be a short-term objective with a view to reducing the caseload
and public expenses, reintegration into the labour market will take less account of the
issue of job quality (Bonvin and Moachon, 2007). Depending on the normative reference
of activation selected, local agents’ responsibility will then coincide either with pursuing
quick professional reintegration (possibly in a precarious job), or with promoting a long-
term and durable reintegration in an attractive job. A key issue in this respect is linked
to the degree of precision of the administrative view of activation: the more specified it
is (e.g. all recipients should go back to work as quickly as possible), the less margin of
manoeuvre is left to local agents, and consequently the less scope for responsibility; by
contrast, the less specified it is (e.g. promote all recipients’ social integration or autonomy),
the more margin of manoeuvre and the higher the scope for responsibility, provided
adequate funding and means are made available. In applying the capability approach
to responsibility, the problem is not activation in itself but the ambition to impose one
and the same conception of activation on all beneficiaries (Bonvin, 2005; Bonvin and
Farvaque, 2007).
Finally, the capacity to act also depends on the opportunities for social and
professional integration open to benefit recipients. In most OECD countries, market actors
are increasingly deemed responsible for job creation. As a consequence, the availability
of working opportunities strongly depends on these market actors’ readiness and ability
to create enough jobs. In this context, the state is called to re-deploy its interventions
from a market-steering to a market-supporting orientation (Levy, 2006), and this may be
achieved in a plurality of ways. The state might be confined to creating the appropriate
conditions to foster entrepreneurship and promote competitiveness and job creation (e.g.
via financial incentives such as job subsidies). Or it can act as a kind of last resort employer
via the development of an extended public sector (which has somehow been the case of
Scandinavian countries, whose share of public employment amounts to the double of the
OECD average – cf. Esping-Andersen, 1999). Or it may choose to subsidise the creation of
a so-called secondary labour market or of an extensive third sector. These various options
impact differently on the quality and quantity of working opportunities, and especially
on their availability to diverse groups of benefit recipients. If the market is the ultimate
provider of working opportunities, access to such jobs may prove difficult for the most
disadvantaged groups. By contrast, if job creation is a task commonly assumed by the
market, the state and the third sector, then these groups will have more opportunities of
professional integration in adequate conditions.
To sum up, with regard to the ‘capacity to act’ side of responsibility, a high level
of resources, a great variety of activation programmes aiming at providing appropriate
solutions for all target groups, as well as plenty of opportunities created by diverse
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actors (the market, the state and the third sector) qualify as more capability-friendly than
their opposite, i.e. few resources, very specified activation schemes and opportunities
provided mainly by the market. Hence, the way these three issues (resources, content of
ALMPs, opportunities) are framed determines to a large extent the possibility to efficiently
support all target groups, and it defines the balance between collective and individual
responsibility and the version of the enabling state that will prevail in the end (Gilbert,
2004). If equipped with appropriate resources and opportunities, local welfare agents
and beneficiaries may rightly be considered as accountable for their actions; in contrast,
public policies marked by retrenchment offer poor resources and opportunities, and
requirements imposed on local agents and beneficiaries to behave responsibly appear as
much more questionable.
Respons ib i l i t y and f reedom to choose in emp loyment serv ices
However, responsibility comprises a second dimension in the capability perspective,
namely real freedom to choose. The main issue at stake here is whether the modes of
governance used to monitor the relationship between the central and the local level
in activation policies leave enough margin of manoeuvre to local actors. Two levels of
contractualism will be considered in the next two subsections: between central level
and local agents on the one side, between local agents and beneficiaries on the other
side.
Con t r ac tua l i sm be tween cen t r a l adm in i s t r a t i on and loca l ac to r s
Bureaucratic provision of services, along standardised lines of intervention, is not adapted
to ALMPs insofar as it is unable to take into account local and individual circumstances
(Varone and Bonvin, 2004). Therefore, bureaucracy needs to be substituted by other
modes of governance in which local agents are called to take on more responsibilities.
However, in order to avoid the potential arbitrariness of purely local decisions, the state
has to monitor these interventions, i.e. to secure that the beneficiaries’ fundamental rights
are respected and that local action keeps in line with centrally designed objectives. With
regard to this role of the central state in ALMPs, three configurations can be identified (cf.
Bonvin and Moachon, 2007; Borghi and Van Berkel, 2007; Newman, 2007) that I suggest
to name ‘hierarchical’, ‘marketised’ and ‘capability-friendly’.
In the first one, the state keeps a strong control over local practices, mainly via the
tools of new public management: quantitative objectives are fixed with financial penalties
for local agents not fulfilling them, budgets are allotted on a short-term and revisable basis,
precise indicators of performance are elaborated, etc. In its most extreme form, this pattern
reinforces the features of bureaucratic action: not only the means and processes of public
action are strictly defined and controlled via input indicators, but also the results are
carefully monitored via output indicators. As a consequence, local agents are not only
responsible for respecting the processes defined by the central administration, but they are
also held accountable for unsatisfactory results and have to abide by the sanctions imposed
on them. The knowledge and competence of local actors is not genuinely recognised in
this configuration. Management by objectives within the public administration, when it is
implemented along these strict lines, is certainly the purest example of this pattern (ALMPs
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in Switzerland go a long way on this managerial path – see Bonvin and Moachon, 2007 –
but this is a common way of governing employment public services as emphasised by Sol
andWesterveld, 2005a). Indeed, the central state hasmore control over local public agents
in its jurisdiction than over contracted-out private providers on whom input indicators
are more difficult to impose. However, private suppliers of social services, be they for
profit or not, may also be subjected to this hierarchical configuration, especially when
their financial dependency vis-a`-vis the state is very high. Under these circumstances,
they are unable either to contest the administrative view of activation (i.e. Hirschman’s
(1970) voice option) or to refuse the conditions defined in the contract (i.e. exit). In such
cases, loyalty is the only available option also for local private actors. Viewed from the
capability perspective, local actors do not enjoy substantive freedom of choice in this
configuration, and therefore cannot be held responsible for what they do.1
In the second instance, the state retreats and leaves a higher margin for manoeuvre
to local actors. In such a model, the state as a provider is considered to have failed.
Thus, it must leave to market actors the responsibility of running efficient professional
reintegration services. But it remains responsible for providing sufficient funding and for
evaluating the efficiency of local action against rough indicators of performance (e.g.
reinsertion rates). Competition between service providers, it is claimed, will improve
the quality of the services as well as the quality–price ratio. As evidenced by Sol and
Westerveld (2005b), the potential advantages of this formula are greater flexibility in the
use of contractors, focus on outcomes rather than processes, and lower costs. All these are
supposedly connected with higher efficiency in the pursuit of centrally fixed targets. In this
model, normative issues related to activation are considered as the exclusive prerogative
of policymakers, and the whole problem is reduced to a matter of technical efficiency in
implementing ALMPs. Market modes of governance are certainly a good tool to improve
efficiency via competition and tendering, but due to their tendency to lower costs (i.e.
give precedence to cheaper providers for the same tasks) and standardise programmes,
they cannot guarantee that an adequate view of activation, i.e. one taking into account
local circumstances and individual features, will be selected at local level. Indeed, such
a configuration based on market modes of governance risks favouring creaming and
selective practices, i.e. the local providers will focus on the beneficiaries that allow
them to reach the targets (fixed in the provision agreement) at the expenses of more
disadvantaged groups (Sol and Westerveld, 2005a, provide illustrations of this risk).
In the third instance, central administration and local agents act as partners in
the implementation of ALMPs. The central state keeps an essential twofold function
as a guarantor of the beneficiaries’ fundamental rights and as a monitoring body of
local action, but these tasks are interpreted in such a way as to promote local actors’
active participation in the implementation of ALMPs. This entails a twofold move from
bureaucratic public action and from the hierarchical model identified above: first towards
a more participative definition of the aims and indicators of public action, second towards
the formulation of more incomplete objectives in order to leave a higher margin for
manoeuvre to local actors. For instance, if the objectives of ALMPs are not defined in
terms of employment rates, but in terms of improving the beneficiaries’ autonomy, then
the scope for responsible local action is extended. Hence, an incomplete definition of
activation at the central level makes space for a ‘politics of needs interpretation’ at the local
level (Fraser, 1989). This third configuration is barely mentioned in Sol and Westerveld’s
survey (2005a) of contractual practices in employment services.2 Yet, this innovative path,
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which means less controlling power for the central administration and more genuine
autonomy for local actors, is not incompatible with the pursuit of efficiency in ALMPs.
Quite the contrary, by giving local agents the means and freedom to act responsibly
(in line with the capability approach), it makes them truly responsible and accountable
for the results obtained.3 In this last pattern, responsibility and accountability do not
boil down to efficient implementation of exogenously defined objectives, but encompass
active involvement in the definition of the most adequate modes of activating people. This
implies another distribution of power between the state, local agents and beneficiaries,
more in line with the so-called participative model of new public management (Monks,
1998). According to the capability approach, contractualism in employment services
should leave the restrictive view of principal-to-agent relationships and embrace a more
participative conception of public action.
Con t r ac tua l i sm be tween loca l agen t s and benefic i a r i e s
The place of the benefit recipient in individualised activation policies needs also to be
questioned. In the hierarchical pattern, the beneficiary’s responsibility is fostered via
obedience to the injunctions of the central administration relayed by local agents acting
as ‘driving belts’. Individual wishes and expectations are taken into account insofar as
they correspond to this specific conception of activation, otherwise it is the local agents’
task to reform them and make them coincide with the institutional expectations. The
chain of governance is conceived as a top–down transfer of specific normative contents
that need to be endorsed and actively pursued by local agents and beneficiaries alike
(Bonvin and Moachon, 2007).
In certain instances of the marketised configuration, the individual is equipped with
more freedom of choice via the provision of vouchers or personal budgets (e.g. Bruttel,
2005). Beneficiaries can express their wishes more freely since they are allowed to choose
their ALMPs. At the core of such practices, there are two postulates: first, the respect of the
beneficiary’s freedom of choice passes via the attribution of a freely disposable income,
i.e. the issue of freedom of choice is framed in terms of consumer choice; second, it
is assumed that a free choice by consumers, in this case benefit recipients, will result
in higher quality of the services provided by private employment agencies. As Sol and
Westerveld (2005b) emphasise, there are many practical obstacles to be overcome before
fulfilling this twofold promise: the great similarity of the solutions provided in marketised
employment services (which considerably restricts the freedom of choice), the asymmetry
of information about the quality of services (which facilitates cheating on customers), and
most importantly the frailty of the recipient’s consumer position. As a matter of fact, the
truly contractual relationship is not between the beneficiary and the provider, but between
the state, responsible for funding vouchers and personal budgets, and the private provider.
The key issue lies here in the capacity of the beneficiary to influence the definition and
content of ALMPs, and it is doubtful whether s/he will really be allowed to have his or her
say in this respect. In comparison with the hierarchical pattern, this configuration takes
some steps towards giving more responsibility to benefit recipients (additional means are
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In the capability-friendly model, the beneficiary is considered as an active citizen
and invited to take part in the definition of ALMPs and in their implementation. Provided
adequate means are granted to empower her and improve her capacity to act, this
pattern engages her in a self-reflexive process (Borghi and Van Berkel, 2007) on how
to best develop her capabilities. The main difference with the marketised pattern lies
in the possibility to co-define and co-implement activation programmes. The capability-
friendly model recognises that rationality is not detained by single actors presumably
more competent than all others, and that the informational role of multi-levelled actors
is essential in any actual policy-making situation. If rationality is distributed or shared
in such a way, then local employment agencies have to be seen as ‘informational
agencies’ (White, 1990), and beneficiaries are informational sources to be mobilised
in the collective definition of ALMPs. What matters then is not how the central state may
impose more efficiently its own normative references on local actors, it is rather how it
can promote the co-definition and co-implementation of activation programmes at local
level.
With regard to the ‘freedom to choose’ side of responsibility, our analysis shows
the importance to take into account local expertise and knowledge, as well as local
circumstances and individual preferences when it comes to designing and implementing
ALMPs. The role of the state, no more as a provider, but as a guarantor and a monitoring
body, is key in this respect. Indeed, local action by itself will not necessarily result
in enhancing the capabilities of all local actors, i.e. local providers and all groups of
beneficiaries alike. A fine-tuned balance needs to be found in the way the central level
connects to local action. In the capability perspective, the normative references defined by
central bodies ought to be both incomplete in order to allow for local initiatives, and quite
strict and precise in defining fundamental rights, in order to prevent local arbitrariness
and all forms of undue intrusion in the beneficiaries’ private sphere that may lead to
‘shameful revelations’ (Wolff, 1998).
Conc lus ion
The capability approach provides the tools for a renewed analysis of the issue of
responsibility in activation policies. First, on the ‘capacity to act’ side of responsibility,
an application of Sen’s (1999) perspective allows for an identification of the importance
of providing sufficient resources and adequate opportunities to local ALMP agents and
beneficiaries. If they are not appropriately equipped in these two key respects, the call
for responsibility remains formal in the Marxist sense, i.e. local actors are invited to
behave responsibly, but they do not have the necessary means for that purpose. In the
capability approach, collective interventions are envisaged as necessary for fostering
individual responsibility, and not as factors producing dependence and irresponsibility.
This implies, for instance, that workfare programmes and all measures exacerbating
individual responsibility without providing adequate collective support are not able to
promote responsibility as it is defined in the capability perspective. Besides, the degree
of precision of the administrative definition of activation also plays a key role with regard
to the issue of responsibility. Indeed, if restricted to very specified solutions such as quick
reintegration into the labour market, the centrally designed definition of activation does
not allow for taking into account all local circumstances and individual characteristics
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and preferences. Such precise targets may prove inappropriate or even unrealistic,
especially for the most disadvantaged groups. In contrast, unspecified objectives, such as
the enhancement of capabilities, allow for more diversified interventions at local level.
Return to work or the promotion of employability are not discarded altogether, but they
are envisaged as possible solutions amid a more extensive set of ALMPs. I therefore
contend that too precise a definition of activation entails selective practices at local level,
which impedes the most disadvantaged groups to enjoy the capacity to act responsibly.
Thus, in this first respect, three prerequisites are identified for a successful promotion of
responsibility among local actors: sufficient resources, adequate opportunities and broad
definitions of activation.
Second, the ‘freedom to choose’ dimension of responsibility greatly depends on the
way to organise coordination between the different actors involved in activation policies.
This encompasses the relationships between central administration and local level on
the one hand, and local providers and individual beneficiaries on the other hand. If
one of these levels prevails over the others and imposes its own specific definition
of activation, freedom of choice gets reduced and, consequently, the conditions for
genuine responsibility are not adequately fulfilled. In the capability perspective, all such
interventions are counterproductive when it comes to fostering responsibility, and the role
of the state is to prevent them. What is suggested is not an unconditional respect for the
local agent’s and the beneficiary’s freedom to choose (whatever their preferences), but the
opportunity offered for them to take an active part in the design and implementation of
ALMPs and to make their voice heard.
In the capability approach, the assessment of responsibility in activation policies
necessitates taking into account two main questions: (a) the balance between individual
and collective responsibility, (b) how the two core issues – capacity to act and freedom to
choose – are framed within this context. The objective is not to define an impracticable
ideal of responsibility, but to provide a yardstick for assessing activation programmes
(e.g. given specific resources and opportunities, and a determined degree of freedom
to choose, what level of individual responsibility can reasonably be expected from
local actors?) and to suggest possible improvements in the direction of fostering more
genuine responsibility among the beneficiaries. In our view, such a conception calling
for more realistic claims to individual responsibility could well represent the way out
of the pitfalls (paradoxical injunctions, double binds, etc.) of most present managerialist
practices.
Notes
1 In Newman’s typology (2007), the patterns of ‘hierarchical governance’ and ‘managerial
governance’ are the most likely to range under this first category.
2 In Switzerland, some cantons privileging the preferred supplier model take some steps towards
this pattern, but there is still a long way to go (Bonvin and Moachon, 2007).
3 This configuration is similar to the ‘participative bureaucratic management and administration
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